Take core knowledge first.
We will see that infants can tackle physics, number, agents and minds thanks to a set of
innate or early-developing abilities, often labelled `core knowledge'.
We don't understand it.
It is important that we don't (yet) know what core knowledge is; `core knowledge' is a term of art.
I haven't explained what it is.
Rather, our position is this.
Some scientists talk about core knowledge, and formulate hypotheses in terms of it.
Since these hypotheses are supported by evidence, we can reasonably suppose they are true.
So there are some things we suppose are truths about core knowledge.
For instance, infants' core knowledge enables them to represent unperceived objects.
So we know some truths about core knowledge, but we don't know what it is.
You'd probably prefer it if I could tell you what core knowledge is first.
But here we have to work backwards.
We have to gather truths about this unknown thing, core knowledge.
And then we have to ask, What could core knowledge be given that these things are true?
is unlike knowledge:
- no introspection
- signature limits
Several features distinguish core knowledge from adult-like understanding: its content is unknowable by introspection and judgement-independent; it is specific to quite narrow categories of event and does not grow by means of generalization; it is best understood as a collection of rules rather than a coherent theory; and it has limited application being usually manifest in the control of attention (as measured by dishabituation, gaze, and looking times) and rarely or never manifest in purposive actions such as reaching.